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JUSTICE IN COMPENSATION
JAMES

W.

NICKEL*

This Article discusses some moral and philosophical issues that
arise in the practice of compensation. This practice, rooted in both
morality and law, typically involves the transfer of money, goods,
or services from a person whose faulty behavior has caused a loss to
the victim of that loss. Compensation may be paid out of a sense of
duty, or as an attempt to repair a shattered relationship, but generally it is paid because it is required by a legal judgment. When a
person who has caused a loss pays compensation the loss is shifted
from the victim to the person who caused it. Because this shift does
not necessarily make the loss easier to bear or less disruptive in its
consequences, one may wonder why it is required. The most common answer is that justice requires it, and it is this alleged connection between justice and compensation that this Article will explore.
By focusing on how considerations of justice bear on the desirability of compensation I do not mean to suggest that these are the only
relevant considerations. Even if considerations of justice are the
dominant considerations in dictating the overall character of compensatory practices in American law - something that I would
hesitate to assert - it is nevertheless likely that these considerations of justice are tempered substantially by other considerations
such as promoting welfare and prosperity, achieving administrative
efficiency, encouraging valuable but risky enterprises, and protecting people against disruptive losses. Because these sorts of
considerations often have considerable relevance to decisions about
whether to award compensation, an account of justice in compensation cannot be translated into a straightforward account of when
people do or should have a legal right to compensation. Conversely,
that this account of justice in compensation does not square directly
with compensatory practices in our legal system is not direct evidence against it.
THE PRAcrIcE OF COMPENSATION

To have a clearer idea of the various cases in which compensation
is held to be appropriate, consider the following examples: (1) someone deliberately allows his cattle to graze on his neighbor's pasture
* A.B., Tabor College; Ph.D., University of Kansas. Associate Professor of Philosophy,
Wichita State University. Visiting Scholar, Columbia University Law School, 1976-77.
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without receiving permission to do so; (2) someone fails to signal a
turn while driving and as a result there is an accident badly injuring
the other driver; (3) someone contracts to buy 4,000 fuchsia neckties, they are delivered as specified, and he refuses to pay; (4) a
person who is indebted to another has inaccurate records of how
much he has paid, makes an overpayment, and the payee refuses
to return the amount by which he was overpaid; (5) a government
exercises its power of eminent domain over a house and lot without
paying the owner its full value; and (6) civilians are deliberately and
unnecessarily killed, wounded, and deprived of their property during wartime. In cases like these it often is claimed that it is just for
the offenders to pay compensation and for the victims to receive it.
Although there are many interesting analogies between compensating a person for work or services and compensating a person for a
loss suffered, and it may be possible to construct an account that
views these two kinds of compensation as different aspects of a
single practice, such an account will not be offered. The concern of
this Article is compensation for injury or loss rather than for services
rendered.
It often is maintained that the immediate goal of compensation
is to restore the level of wealth and welfare that the victim had prior
to the injury - the status quo ante. This is not entirely correct. If,
for example, the victim was engaged in activities at the time of his
injury that would have increased substantially his level of wealth
and welfare by the time of compensation, and if these prospects
were destroyed by the injury, then merely to return him to his preinjury level would be to leave him worse off than if he had not been
injured. Although there often are practical reasons why it is unwise
or impossible to make the innocent victim as well off at the time of
compensation and thereafter as he would have been at those times
had the loss not occurred, this seems to be the ideal. The victim of
an injury may receive as compensation a larger amount of goods
than it would be fair for him to have if his past losses were not
considered. The practice of compensation alters present holdings' in
response to past events, giving the victim a larger share now in order
to counterbalance the smaller share that he had to live with in the
past because of an unjustifiable loss.
1. The term "holdings" is taken from R. NoztcK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974), and
refers to the possession of things, both tangible and intangible. Thus, holdings, as used here,
may include not only money and property, but also such things as life, liberty, health, and
happiness.
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Not every loss that a person suffers entitles that person to compensation, and not every loss that a person causes creates an obligation to compensate the loser. If a person breaks his leg, apart from
contractual coverage, no one will be obligated to pay his medical
expenses - even if he was faultless in breaking his leg. Similarly,
if A's ringing B's doorbell in a normal way causes B's china shelf to
collapse, A's role in causing a loss will not make him morally or
legally liable. It generally is held that for a person to be obligated
to compensate another for a loss there must be some shortcoming
on his part in causing the loss. And, for a person to have a right to
compensation, it generally is held that there must be some person
2
at fault who therefore has the obligation to provide compensation.
But when the traditional fault system is modified by widely-held
liability insurance contracts, those whose faulty actions cause losses
are protected from direct liability. Nonfault systems have the same
result, but provide compensation for losses without determining
who was at fault. 3 Both types of insurance systems serve as lossspreading mechanisms because they do not impose the cost of the
loss on either the victim or the person at fault but spread it over a
large group of policy holders or taxpayers. As a result the person at
fault is relieved of the burden of paying compensation. His payments into the system typically cover only a small part of the loss
that he caused. The rest is borne by persons who are likely to be as
innocent as the victim. 4 A system of this sort makes it possible to
compensate the victim without imposing ruinous losses on the person at fault, and this is an advantage from the perspective of utility.
A question, to be discussed below, is whether these systems are
compatible with the requirements of justice.

A

LINK BETWEEN JUSTICE AND COMPENSATION

The suggestion developed in the rest of this Article is that an
important link between justice and compensation is that compensa2. Of course, the doctrine ofstrict liability, which exacts as the price for engaging in certain
dangerous or unusual activities an obligation to compensate for any injuries or harm caused
by such activities regardless of fault, is an exception to the general rule of liability based on
fault.
3. See G. CALABRESi, THE CosT OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Blum & Kalven, The Empty Cabinet
of Dr. Calabresi: Auto Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 239 (1967);
Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensationand Selective Reimbursement, 53
VA. L. REv. 774 (1967). For a history of the fault criterion see Fleming, The Role of Negligence

in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 815 (1967).
4. R. KEETON, VENTUR ING To Do JUSTICE 127 (1969).
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tion protects just distributions, and the rights they involve, by
undoing, insofar as possible, actions that disturb such distributions.
Put briefly, justice is a matter of people having those things that
they deserve, are entitled to, or otherwise ought to have, and compensation serves justice by preventing and undoing actions that
would prevent people from having these things.
A statement by Rawls about Aristotle's view of justice provides a
useful starting point in developing this position.
The more specific sense that Aristotle gives to justice, and from
which the most familiar formulations derive, is that of refraining
from pleonexia, that is, from gaining some advantage for oneself
by seizing what belongs to another, his property, his reward, his
office and the like, or by denying a person that which is due to
him, the fulfillment of a promise, the repayment of a debt, the
showing of proper respect, and so on .

. .

. Aristotle's definition

clearly presupposes, however, an account of what properly belongs to a person and of what is due to him. 5
The basic philosophical problem about justice is to provide such an
account of the rights, benefits, and duties that people ought to have
in various circumstances. If we had such an account we would have
an account of what things are injustices, and compensation could
be connected with justice in terms of the role that it plays in preventing and remedying some of those injustices. As Rawls' work
illustrates, offering a general account of justice is a monumental
task. I will not offer such an account but will try to show how
compensation could be connected with such an account of justice if
we had one that was satisfactory.
For a simple illustration of how compensation can protect just
distributions, suppose that the following case arose in a society
whose overall distribution was basically just. Jones, who had borrowed $20,000 from Smith, made an overpayment of $1,000 in repaying the loan because of inaccurate records, and Smith refused
to return the money when the mistake was discovered although
there was no doubt that Jones had a clear right to it. In this case
Smith's action is rather like theft, and its results are that Jones's
right to the $1,000 has been violated, Smith has $1,000 that he has
no right to, and the distribution of goods resulting from the transaction is less just than the one existing previously. If Smith is required
to return the money, Jones's right to it will be affirmed, Smith will
5. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUsMcE 10 (1971).
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not have $1,000 that he has no right to, and the just distribution
that his action upset will be restored. By undoing unjustifiable
losses and gains, compensation protects people's rights to the justifiable holdings and thus preserves the fair aspects of existing distributions. Compensation, by upholding rights after they have been violated, provides a second line of defense for rights and fair holdings.
Compensation also may serve to deter initial violations because
potential offenders will know that it is likely they will have to remedy their offense, that is, that their offense will create an enforceable
obligation to give up what they gained and to restore what the
victim lost.
It is useful to conceive of the obligation to provide compensation
which often arises as a result of violating someone's rights as one of
the obligations that creates and supports a secure system of just
holdings. On this view, a person's right to his life savings is not just
a matter of other people being obligated not to take the money away
from him by force or fraud; it is also a matter of other people being
obligated to return the money if they do. A right is not extinguished
by its violation; rather, respecting the right after one has violated
it requires restoration or replacement instead of mere noninterference. On this view, an obligation to compensate (and the
corresponding right to compensation) is integral to the creation and
maintenance of a secure system of just holdings even though this
obligation arises only when there has been a failure to act appropriately in regard to the holdings of others.
Because this approach to the connection between justice and
compensation emphasizes the function of compensation in preserving desirable states of affairs one might take the approach to be
utilitarian. This would be incorrect. The approach justifies the practice of compensation in terms of its results, but the approach is
nevertheless not utilitarian because the end in terms of which compensation is justified is not utility but justice. The justification is
not that compensation makes victims better off, but that compensation restores just aspects of distributions by returning to people the
things to which they are entitled. The same reasons that make a just
distribution desirable also make desirable the preservation and restoration of such distributions. Deterrence of violations of rights and
security of justifiable holdings are not exclusively utilitarian considerations; they are considerations of justice as well. Furthermore, if
one views these as strictly utilitarian considerations one will find
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that there is not much content left in considerations of justice.,
Although I do not intend to offer a general account of what a just
distribution is or of what a justifiable or fair holding is, it may be
helpful in giving some content to these key terms to sketch the basic
elements of such an account. The most familiar account of justice
is in terms of desert: a distribution is said to be just when each
person's holdings are in proportion to his or her deserts. The difficulty with this characterization is that not all of the facts that we
consider relevant to the justness of a distribution can be accommodated within the framework of deserts unless the notion of desert is
conceived in a misleadingly broad way. If, for example, Jones has
$50 that is rightfully his, and he makes a gift of it to Smith, Smith's
holding of that $50 will be just, other things being equal, even if he
has done nothing to deserve it. 7 Instead of saying that a just distri-

bution is one in which each person has what he or she deserves, we
might say that a distribution is just if each person's holdings are
justifiable. Just as the former claim needs to be filled in with an
account of how people come to deserve things, the latter claim needs
to be supplemented with an account of the various ways in which
holdings can be justified. For example, a holding might be justifiable because one has a natural right to it, as one might have to life
or liberty. Another way to justify a holding might be in terms of
deserving or earning the good that is held, as one might deserve a
prize or wages for one's work. A third method of justification is in
terms of a fair transaction from which the holding results, such as
certain gifts, trades, and contracts. This list of justifying considerations is only sketched, but it does indicate the ways in which it is
necessary to go beyond deserts in order to give an adequate account
of justice in holdings. It should be noted that holdings as used here
include not only such items as money and property but also goods
such as life, liberty, health, and reputation.' A person who is deprived wrongfully and permanently of his or her ability to work and
who receives no compensation for this loss is surely a victim of
greater injustice than a person who, for example, is unjustly underpaid by $3,000 a year for the work that he or she does.
Although we may wish to postulate a right to compensation from
6. Calabresi sharply separates the reduction of accident costs from justice and then finds
that justice has little content as a goal but is merely a sort of background constraint.
CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 24-26.
7. See NozicK, supra note 1, at 155-60.
B. See note 1 supra.
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the state in cases in which there is no individual who is obligated
and available to provide compensation-for example, for victims of
unapprehended criminals-the obligation to compensate normally
falls on individuals and not on the state. When one's shortcoming
results in an unjustifiable loss to another, the primary obligation to
compensate will fall on the injurer. This is a consequence of the fact
that a person's right to his holdings is a right against other people;
they are obligated to refrain from harming, interfering with, or appropriating his holdings. If they do not refrain from doing these
things they still are obligated, but the obligation is to restore, replace, or repair what was taken or damaged. Put another way, a
person can incur an obligation to provide compensation if he wrongfully causes a substantial loss to another person. The reason for
requiring such a person to compensate his victim is not, as a retributivist might contend, to make him suffer or to apportion his wellbeing to his deserts. It is rather to protect justifiable holdings
against the invasions of others. If the offender must use a portion
of his holdings in repairing the injury he caused, this is justified not
retributively but in terms of the protection of holdings. The principle seems to be that losses in holdings that are necessary to meet
one's obligations are not unjust. This principle has wider application than merely to the theory of compensation: no injustice results
from having to give up some of one's justifiable holdings to meet
one's obligations of charity or to meet one's obligations to support
the public good in areas such as security, public works, and education. If I am correct in thinking that this principle is adequate to
explain the justness of requiring offenders to compensate their victims, then no retributive principle, not even a weak one,9 is needed
to justify the practice of compensation.
It might be objected at this point that it has not been explained
why the offending individual should be obligated to pay compensation because the goal of protecting just holdings can be achieved by
having government compensate injured individuals. Although an
obligation to compensate the victims of one's wrongdoing now is
viewed as one of the obligations that creates and supports a system
of justifiable holdings, such a system would be possible without such
obligations if government were prepared to compensate losses
caused by wrongdoing. This objection seems well-founded in princi9. For a discussion of weak and strong retributive principles and their possible application
to the morality of compensation see J. FEINBERG, Sua Culpa. in DOING AND DESERVING 217-19
(1970).
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ple. Because I do not view compensation by the offender as an
inherent requirement of justice but rather view its connection with
justice as deriving from its role in preserving just distributions, any
particular compensatory mechanism will have to be evaluated in
terms of its effectiveness in doing this. Hence, if a system in which
the state assumes the obligation to compensate can be shown (either
generally or in a particular area) to be as effective as traditional
methods in preserving just distributions, and if it can be shown that
there is no injustice in the way in which it obtains the funds to do
so, it will be equally acceptable on grounds of justice.
Insurance systems spread the cost of compensating accident victims over a large group of policy holders, thereby relieving a person
who causes an injury by his wrongdoing or negligence of any personal liability. In accordance with the criterion just presented there
is no injustice in such systems because they provide an alternative
means for satisfying the requirement of justice that losses to innocent persons resulting from human shortcomings be compensated
and because the systems collect the funds for doing this in a way
that, presumably, is just. If, as a retributivist might contend, the
goal were to make the offender suffer, relieving him of his personal
liability would be unjust. But in my account there is no such objection to cost-spreading systems, even nonfault ones.
There are some problems, however, in using cost-spreading systems in dealing with deliberate wrongs, and I think this is why such
systems operate mainly in the area of accidents.10 One problem is
that in many cases of deliberate wrongdoing the offender profits
from his offense, and in such cases the unjustifiable gain, as well as
the victim's unjustifiable loss, is an injustice. Requiring the wrongdoer to compensate his victim often eliminates this unjustifiable
gain while simultaneously eliminating the victim's unjustifiable
loss. A cost-spreading system that ignored these gains would be
deficient from the perspective of justice. A second problem is that
a system requiring individuals to compensate the victims of their
wrongdoing serves to deter wrongdoers (because wrongdoing is made
less profitable) and hence makes the system of justifiable holdings
more secure. For example, if a compensation system permitted
criminals to suffer no bad consequences because of their evil deeds,
10. New Zealand has gone the farthest among common law countries toward developing a
nonfault compensation system for all victims of accidents and crimes. See Palmer & Lemons,
Toward the Disappearanceof Tort Law - New Zealand's New Compensation Plan, 1972 U.
ILL. L. FORuM 693.

1976]

JUSTICE IN COMPENSATION

one could object that the deterrence of crime, and hence the protection of justifiable holdings, would suffer. This objection would be
based on considerations of justice as well as considerations of utility.
These problems can be avoided, however, if cost-spreading systems
are supplemented with mechanisms, such as a system of fines and
penalties, for eliminating unjustifiable gains and for deterring potential offenders. Hence there is no reason, in principle, why systems that spread all of the costs of wrongdoing and negligence could
not be compatible with justice. Such systems have some advantages
from the perspective of justice because they provide an effective
means of compensating all victims of wrongdoing and negligence
(who survive) by not making the satisfaction of the victim's claim
to compensation depend on the apprehension of the offender or on
the offender's ability to pay.
COMPENSATION AND UNJUSTIFIABLE HOLDINGS

An effective system of compensation will make a just distribution
more secure, but it also will make an unjust distribution more secure. Compensation by itself will not create a just distribution.
Although I am prepared to allow that one aspect of justice may be
the provision of security for reasonable expectations, people's expectations may be secure in orderly but terribly unjust societies. A
consequence of my account of the link between justice and compensation is that compensation is required by justice only when the
holding it restores was held justifiably.
In most societies many aspects of the existing distribution are
unjust - people have goods to which they have no right, and lack
goods to which they do have a right. In this kind of situation the
practice of compensation may restore to a person something that he
or she had no right to, thereby preserving the injustice of the original
distribution. That systems of compensation often have this result is
one reason we sometimes find them morally troublesome, even if we
allow that the system of compensation nevertheless serves to protect
reasonable expectations arising out of the existing distribution and
allow that it often would be difficult or impossible for judges and
juries to make sound judgments about the justifiability of particular
holdings.
Restoring to a person a good of which he was deprived by someone
else's offense will promote justice only if his holding of that good was
justifiable. This contention is similar to the principle that a person
who comes before a court of equity must come with "clean hands."
But merely refusing to restore a good to its original holder seldom
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will promote a just distribution. If A holds a good unjustifiably, and
if B, who also has no claim to the good, deprives him of it through
wrongdoing or negligence, neither compensation nor noncompensation will award the good to its rightful holder. The only
way of creating a more just distribution is to take the thing away
from both of them and return it to its rightful holder; this, however,
is often difficult or impossible. This kind of action is not normally
taken by courts, but it sometimes is done informally on a small scale
by individuals and very crudely on a large scale when governments
undertake programs of redistribution.
In any distribution, however unjust, there will be some justifiable
holdings that people have such as their lives, health, and basic
personal possessions, and hence in any distribution compensation
can promote justice by protecting these holdings. In practice, however, there are many holdings that are difficult to classify as justifiably or unjustifiably held. Because of the difficulty of determining
whether particular goods are held justifiably, great deference is allowed in our practice to whether a person has a legal right to a good
and to whether there was anything legally wrong with the way in
which he acquired it. If there is no legal basis for saying that someone else should hold the good rather than he, his holding is apt to
be viewed as both legally and morally acceptable. Furthermore, a
good may not retain its tainted character when it is passed on
through a legitimate transaction. If, for example, a rich swindler
pays his maid fair wages out of his wrongfully acquired funds, this
does not undermine the maid's right to the money. Other transactions, such as inheritance, may have a different character, however.
If A's father grossly underpaid B's father during a long period of
service as an employee, and if as a result A is rich because of his
inheritance and B is poor because his father had no means to provide him with an inheritance or anything else, we may feel that A
has a moral obligation to compensate B. Many historic injustices to
groups are analogous to this example and thus seem to raise issues
of justice in compensation."
Although it is difficult to know how to deal with historic injustices, the analysis of justice in compensation presented here suggests that the requirements of justice in compensation are not separate from the requirements of bringing about a just distribution.
"Distributive" and "compensatory" justice are not really separate
categories.
11. This example is based on Kaufman, Black Reparations319 (1969).
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